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A b stract
Image compression-based approaches fo r defending against the adversarial-example attacks, which threaten the safety use o f deep neural networks (DNN), have been in vestigated recently. However, prior works mainly rely on directly tuning parameters like compression rate, to blindly reduce image features, thereby lacking guarantee on both defense efficiency (i.e. accuracy o f polluted images) and classification accuracy o f benign images, after applying de fense methods. To overcome these limitations, we propose a JPEG-based defensive compression framework, namely "feature distillation", to effectively rectify adversarial ex amples without impacting classification accuracy on benign data. Our framework significantly escalates the defense efficiency with marginal accuracy reduction using a twostep method: First, we maximize malicious features filtering o f adversarial input perturbations by developing defensive quantization infrequency domain o f JPEG compression or decompression, guided by a semi-analytical method; Sec ond, we suppress the distortions o f benign features to re store classification accuracy through a DNN-oriented quan tization refine process. Our experimental results show that proposed " feature distillation" can significantly surpass the latest input-transformation based mitigations such as Quilt ing and TV Minimization in three aspects, including defense efficiency (improve classification accuracy from ~ 20% to ~ 90% on adversarial examples), accuracy o f benign im ages after defense (< 1% accuracy degradation), and pro cessing time per image 259 x Speedup). Moreover, our solution can also provide the best defense efficiency (~ 60% accuracy) against the recent adaptive attack with least ac curacy reduction 1 %) on benign images when compared with other input-transformation based defense methods.
In trod u ction
Recent studies have shown that DNN models are inher ently vulnerable to adversarial examples (AEs) [10, 24] , i.e. malicious inputs crafted by adding small and human-imperceptible perturbations to normal inputs, strongly fool ing the cognitive function of DNNs. For example, in image recognition, adversarially manipulating the perceptual sys tems of autonomous vehicles by physically captured adver sarial images, i.e. via camera or sensor [17, 22] , can lead to the misreading on road signs, thus causing potential disas trous consequences in DNN-based cyber-physical systems.
Many countermeasures [15, 14, 20, 23, 25, 2] have been proposed to enhance the robustness of DNNs against ad versarial examples, mainly including DNN model-specific hardening strategies and model-agnostic defenses [11] . Typical model-specific solutions like "adversarial training" or "defensive distillation" may rectify the model parame ters to mitigate the attacks by using the iterative retrain ing procedure or masking adversarial gradient. The modelagnostic approaches such as input dimensionality reduc tion [5, 26] or direct JPEG compression [9, 7, 11] attempt to remove adversarial perturbations from the inputs, before feeding them into DNN classifiers.
In this work, we focus on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of compression based model-agnostic mitiga tion against adversarial examples. Though standard JPEG compression has been explored to mitigate the adversarial examples [9, 7] , it can neither effectively remove the ad versarial perturbations, nor guarantee the classification ac curacy on benign images, due to its focus on human visual quality. Instead, we propose the DNN-favorable JPEG com pression, namely " feature distillation", by redesigning the standard JPEG compression algorithm, in order to maxi mize the defense efficiency while assuring the DNN testing accuracy. In specific, 1) We reveal the root reason to limit the JPEG defense efficiency by analyzing the frequency fea ture distributions of adversarial input perturbations during JPEG compression; 2) Inspired by our observation, we pro pose a semi-analytical method to guide the defensive quan tization process to maximize the effectiveness of filtering adversarial features; 3) We characterize the importance of input features for DNNs by leveraging the statistical fre quency component analysis within JPEG, and then develop DNN-oriented quantization method to recover the degraded accuracy (i.e., a side-effect induced by the feature loss in perturbation removal) on benign samples. Our proposed method is built upon the light modifica tions of widely adopted JPEG compression and does not require any expensive model retraining or multiple model predictions. Evaluations show that " feature distillation" offers significantly improved effectiveness against a vari ety of mainstream adversarial examples (i.e., > 90% accu racy on AEs), with very marginal accuracy reduction (i.e., < 1%) on benign data. Besides, it well beats recent pro posed image transformation based defense like Quilting and TV Minimization in terms of defense efficiency, accuracy and processing speed. Furthermore, our solution offers the best defense efficiency (~ 60%) with lowest accuracy loss (< 1%) against the recent adaptive attack-Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA) [3] among existing input-transformation based defenses, though it is not com pletely immune to such attack. To our best knowledge, there is no published work that can completely mitigate BPDA, since it is very challenging fo r defense if attackers can it eratively strengthen the adversarial examples according to the defense. However, we believe our work provides a new angle to redesign input-based defense to well balance the accuracy o f benign data and defense efficiency with DNNoriented/defensive quantization. It is a new trial towards developing better input-transformation based defenses.
B ack grou nd, R elated W ork and M otivation

Basics o f Adversarial Examples and JPEG
Adversarial examples: (X* = X + δ χ ) are created to fool the DNNs (Y* φ Y ) with imperceptible pertur bations: argmin<5x || δ χ || s.t. F^( X + ö x ) = Y*, which can be solved through many crafting algorithms: 1) FGSM [10] (fast gradient sign method) is a attack and utilizes the gradient of the loss function to determine the direction to modify all the input pixels. It is designed to be fast, rather than optimal; 2) BIM [13] (basic iterative gradient sign method) is the iterative version of FGSM by gradually adding small perturbations a (Loo) until reach ing the upper bound e or achieving successful attack; 3)
Deepfool [16] uses geometrical knowledge to search the minimal perturbations (L2) by assuming DNN as a lin ear classifier and each class is separated by a hyper-plane. Such an approach finds the nearest hyper-plane from X and uses geometrical knowledge to calculate the projec tion distance; 4) C&W [6] (Carlini & Wagner method) are a series of L 0, L2, and attacks that achieve 100% attack success rate with much lower distortions compar ing with the above-mentioned attacks. In particular, the C&W 1/2 attack uses a more effective objective function f(x) = max(max{Z(X)i г φ t} -Z (X )t,-n) with logits Z(X)i and adjustable parameter к. Further, C&W Lo and Loo attacks are implemented indirectly by itera tively calling their L2 attack. 5) BPDA [3] is the lat est adaptive attack by recurrently computing the adversar ial gradient after applying defense: x* = dip(x + e ■ sgn(4xJe,Y(DEF(x)))), where J represents the function of an DNN model and DEF is the applied defense method in BPDA attack. It is state-of-the-art of attack by assuming adversaries know the defense method. JPEG: [27] is a popular lossy compression standard for digital images based on the fact that Human-Visual System (HVS) is less sensitive to the high frequency components than low frequency ones [31] . A typical JPEG compression mainly consists of image partitioning, discrete cosine trans formation (DCT), quantization, zig-zag reordering and en tropy coding, etc. [27] . To compress a raw image, the high (low) frequency DCT coefficients are usually scaled more (less) and then rounded to nearest integers by performing element-wise division based on a predefined 8 x 8 Quanti zation Table (Q-Table) [27] . The trade-off between image quality and compression rate is realized by scaling each el ement in Q-Table via the "Quantization Factor" (QF) [30] . A higher compression rate corresponds to a lower QF. A reverse procedure of above steps can decompress an image.
Related Works
Applying JPEG compression to mitigate adversarial ex amples has been discussed in prior work. Kurakin et al. [13] test some model-agnostic approaches on adversarial ex amples and reveal a good potential of JPEG compression for defending adversarial attacks. Dziugaite et al. [9] em pirically report JPEG compression can reverse only small adversarial perturbations, but the reason behind is uncer tain. Guo et al. [11] test JPEG compression, image Quilt ing (piecing together small patches from a database of im age patches), total variance minimization (combining pixel dropout with total variation minimization), etc. against the gray-box and black-box adversarial attacks, and report Quilting and TVM show better efficiency than JPEG. Aydemir et al. [4] compare the effects of JPEG compression and JPEG2000, against adversarial perturbations. Though JPEG2000 shows better performance than JPEG, the ef ficiency is still far from satisfactory. Xu et al. [29] pro pose an ensemble method, namely "feature squeezing", to defeat the adversarial examples by integrating differ ent types of "squeezers" (i.e. model-agnostic processing). Das et al. [7] propose a JPEG compression based ensem ble method, namely "vaccinating", to mitigate adversarial attacks by voting the result based on a variety of compres sion rates. Prakash et al. [18] develop "pixel deflection" and "adaptive soft-thresholding" approaches by replacing or smoothing adversary perturbations. This method shows good defense efficiency on gray box-setting without eval uating adaptive attacks. Xie. et al. [28] propose two ran domization operations-random size and random padding, against adversary examples.
In summary, prior studies empirically test the JPEG compression by directly tuning the compression rate, without digging into the underly ing image processing mechanisms. The conclusion is that JPEG suffers from very limited defense efficiency but in evitable DNN accuracy degradation. To overcome those issues, standard JPEG compression should be integrated with the costly ensemble solutions. On the other side, our work directly targets the fundamental entities o f JPEG compression/decompression, like defensive and DNN-oriented quantizations, to unleash its defense potentials with almost zero loss o f DNN testing accuracy, thus is low-cost.
Why standard JPEG is not good?
DNN suffers from both low testing accuracy and weak defense efficiency against adversarial examples if we di rectly employ standard JPEG compression based on humanvisual system (HVS). To explore how existing compres sion can impact DNN's testing accuracy, we trained a Mo bileNet [12] with high quality JPEG images (QF=100, Im ageNet), and tested it with both clear images and FGSMbased adversarial examples at various QFs (i.e., QF=100, 90, 75, 50). As Fig. 1 (a) shows, the testing accuracy de grades significantly as the compression rate increases (or QF from 100 to 50), despite the slightly improved defense efficiency (or drop in attack success rate). To achieve the best defense efficiency among our selected four QFs (attack success rate = 0.62 at QF = 50), the accuracy is even reduced by r^j 8% on benign images than that of the original one (QF=100). Apparently, the HVS-based JPEG compression is not an ideal solution in terms of defense efficiency and accuracy. Fig. 1 (b) further shows the means and standard deviations of DCT coefficients of malicious distortions at all 64 frequency bands. Given that malicious perturbations are almost randomly distributed in every frequency band, HVS-based JPEG compression, which distorts more (less) on high (low) frequency components of the input, is un likely to effectively filter the distortions across the whole spectral domain.
. O ur A p p ro a ch -F ea tu re D istilla tio n
In this section, we first provide a detailed analysis on how to wisely redesign the quantization process in JPEG compression to minimize attack success rate. As this lossy compression will still reduce the classification accuracy (see Fig. 1 ), we then develop the DNN-oriented quantization refine method, to compensate the reduced accuracy of be nign images. Based on how/where the derived quantiza tion will be placed in JPEG, our framework supports two modes (see Fig. 2 ): 1) One pass process by inserting a new quantization/de-quantization only in the decompres sion of standard JPEG; 2) Two pass process by also re placing the quantization of compression, followed by one pass process. The two pass method provides an opportu nity to directly embed crafted quantization at sensor side to compress raw data to further improve defense efficiency, given that JPEG-based image compression, an integrated component in sensors, is usually a "must-have" step to save data storage/transfer cost in real applications. Therefore, the one-pass handles incoming images compressed by standard JPEG before sending them to DNNs, while the two-pass tar gets raw data directly sampled by devices like image sen sors. The target is to address both attack efficiency and test accuracy simultaneously.
Step 1: Defensive Quantization for Enhancing Defense Efficiency
We propose to use spectral filter by leveraging quantiza tion process in JPEG on DNN inputs (i.e., adversarial ex amples), in order to mitigate adversarial perturbations.
One pass process. The idea is to directly filter out the malicious perturbations in frequency domain through the quantization process. As Fig. 2 shows, the JPEG-formatted input will be decompressed and then feed into the DNNs as the raw data at the beginning. By taking this chance, we insert a new pair of quantization/dequantization processes after the dequantization of standard JPEG decompression to purify the potential adversarial perturbations. Note we omit the first dequantization in the following analysis ideally by assuming it can almost preserve all frequency features of the input. Assuming for each 8 x 8 block in the input image X , adversarial distortion δ χ is added to X with intensity e. The DCT transformation-a linear operation, essentially projects the image from spatial domain to spectral domain. Therefore, the original input and adversarial perturbations could be linearly separated as:
where C x and Cgx are the DCT coefficients of X and δ χ , respectively, for the 8 x 8 image block, and В is the DCT transformation basis. The maximum magnitude of Cgx can be calculated by the summation of all 64 frequency compo nents and each term is bounded by cos(9) ■ e. Thus we have -8 · e < Cgx < 8 ■ e. The DCT coefficients will be quan tized again in this decompression process, providing a good opportunity for filtering the perturbations. The quantization is approximated as:
where QS is the defensive quantization step (QS). Ideally, if QS > \Cgx |, then the perturbation Cgx can be elimi nated. However, this equation may induce undesired round ing error to limit the efficiency of removing malicious per turbations, given that Cgx is usually much smaller than Οχ. We further analyze such a rounding error by decomposing Ο χ = η + Qs/ 2, then we have:
R ound {gx+c»x/qs) = R ound (' n+QS/ 2+c sx /Q s) (3)
If Qs/ 2 + Cgx > Q S, this part will be rounded to ±1, ± 2 , ±3..., which will induce a stronger rounding er ror than the adversarial perturbations, resulting in degraded defense efficiency.
Two pass process. To avoid such rounding error, we further propose two pass method. As Fig. 2 shows, the raw data (i.e. sampled by sensors) will be compressed through a defensive quantization process, rather than the standard JPEG quantization, followed by an entire one pass pro cess. Assuming such compressed benign inputs are then polluted by adversarial perturbations, adversarial examples will be further processed by considering both compression/decompression procedures as:
The malicious perturbations can be appropriately filtered without inducing any rounding error if Q S satisfies the fol lowing equation:
R ou n d (c sx /QS) = 0 =r-QS > 2 \Cgx | , Cgx e ( -8e < Cgx < 8e) (5) Therefore, we adopt the same QS (Q S > 16 ■ c) to eliminate the perturbations Cgx in both passes.
Step 2: DNN-Oriented Quantization for Com pensating Accuracy Reduction
To recover the testing accuracy (see Section 2.3), our next step is to develop a DNN-oriented JPEG compression method by refining the defensive quantization table from step 1. We analyze the difference between human visual system (HVS) and DNN on feature extractions, and then propose a heuristic design flow.
Difference between HVS&DNN on Feature Extrac tions.
Since the feature loss happens in the frequency do main after the DCT process, we first study the problem that which frequency components have the most significant im pact on DNN results. Assume Xk is a single pixel of a raw image X , and Xk can be represented by 8 x 8 DCT:
where c^k.ij) and b^j-j are the DCT coefficient and its basis function at 64 different frequencies, respectively. It is well known that the human visual system (HVS) is less sensi tive to high frequency components but more sensitive to low frequency ones. The JPEG quantization table is designed based on this fundamental understanding. However, DNNs examine the importance of the frequency information in a quite different way. The gradient of the DNN function F with respect to a basis function is calculated as:
9F/db(i,n = 9F/dxk X 9xk/dbij = 9F/dxk X C(k,i,j) (7) Eq. (7) implies that the contribution of a frequency com ponent (bi,j) to the DNN result will be mainly decided by its associated DCT coefficient (C{k,i,j)) and the importance of the pixel (dF/dxk). Here C(k,i,j) will be distorted by the quantization before training. Ideally a well trained DNN model should respond with different strengths to all the 64 frequency components depending on the C(k,i,-j) values. From this observation, large C(k,i,j) should be compressed less (using a small quantization step) in order to ensure a desirable classification accuracy. In contrast, the default quantization table used in JPEG focuses on compressing more on less sensitive frequency components to HVS. As a result, in order to defend against adversarial attacks, aggressive compression is required, making DNNs easily misclassified if original versions con tain important high frequency features. The DNN models trained with original images learn comprehensive features, especially high frequency ones. However, such features are actually lost in more compressed testing images, resulting in considerable misclassification rate (see Fig. 1(a) ).
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Extract coefficients for each frequency component
Therefore, we propose to compensate the accuracy reduction incurred by defending adversarial examples through a heuristic design flow (see Fig. 3 ): 1) character ize the importance of each frequency component through frequency analysis on benign images; 2) lower the quantiza tion step of the most sensitive frequency components based on the statistical information for enhancing accuracy.
A: Frequency Component Analysis. For each input
image, we first characterize the pre-quantized DCT coef ficient distribution at each frequency component. Such a distribution represents the energy contribution of each fre quency band [19] . Prior work [19] has proved that the pre quantized coefficients can be approximated as normal (or Laplace) distribution with zero mean but different standard deviations (âij). A larger 5ij means more energy in band (i,j), hence more important features for DNN learning. As Fig. 3 shows, each image will be first partitioned into N 8 x 8 blocks, followed by a block-wise DCT. Then the DCT coefficient distribution at each frequency component will be characterized by sorting all coefficients at the same fre quency component across all image blocks. The statistical information, such as the standard deviation öij of each co efficient, will be calibrated from each individual histogram.
B: Quantization Table Refinement.
Once the impor tance of frequency components is identified based on the standard deviations of DCT coefficients (Si.j), the next step is to boost the accuracy of legitimate examples {acc{\ (re fer to the testing accuracy of benign images processed after the defense method). Our analysis in Section 2.3 indicates that a proper selection of Q S can effectively mitigate the perturbations, whereas larger Q S will induce more quanti zation errors. Therefore, we reduce the quantization errors of the most sensitive frequency components to enhance the testing accuracy by lowering their corresponding quantiza tion steps within the quantization table, but such frequency components should be as few as possible to maintain the defense efficiency. In specific, we first sort the magnitude of ô ij in an ascending order as -, then set the appropriate quantization step based on δ\ ·. To simplify our design, we introduce a discrete mapping function to derive the quanti zation step on each frequency band, base on the associated standard deviation öij, i.e., QSij = (öij < T ? 5 i : S2 ), where T is the threshold to divide the 64 frequency compo nents. Note that Si > S2 · The 64 frequency components are divided into two bands (see Fig. 3 ): the red colored Ac curacy Sensitive (AS) band with QS = S2 , and the blue colored Malicious Defense (MD) band with QS = S\ from Section 3.1.
. E valu ation
In this section, we first explore the parameter optimiza tion in our feature distillation under the constraints of high classification accuracy on malicious inputs after applying defense, while preserving the accuracy of legitimate ones given that both types of data can arrive for a realistic DNN testing. Then we comprehensively evaluate feature distilla tion under following three different settings: 1). Gray-box:
We assume the adversary has full access to DNN model, but is unaware of the input transformations applied (defense method unaware) [11, 8] . 2). White-box: We consider ad versary has full access to the DNN model, as well as the full knowledge of the defense method [3] , which is more challenging. 3). Black-box: We assume adversary does not know the exact network architecture and weights, instead, can use a substitute model to craft adversarial perturbations that are transferable to the target model [11] . 
Experimental Setup
Our experiments are conducted on the Tensorflow DNN computing framework [1] , running with Intel(R) Xeon(R) 3.5GHz CPU and two parallel GeForce GTX 1080TÎ GPUs. Our proposed feature distillation method is imple mented on the heavily modified adversarial machine learn ing library-EvadeML-Zoo [29] for white and gray-box set tings and BPDA attack [3] for white box setting. To bet ter illustrate the image compression based mitigation, we choose the large-scaled ImageNet dataset as our bench mark. Four other input-based countermeasures, including default JPEG [9, 13] , bit-depth (one of the feature squeez ing methods by reducing the bit number of an image pixel) [29] and the recent proposed TV Minimization (TVM) and Image Quilting [11] , are selected as the baselines to com pare with our proposed feature distillation. M ethodology. Various types of adversarial example at tacks, i.e., FGSM, BIM, Deepfool, CW2, CW0, CWoe and adaptive attack-BPDA, have been simulated in our experi ments for evaluating the defense. We adopt a similar evalua tion model from [29] . First, we choose 1000 benign images (one per class) to evaluate the testing accuracy of each DNN model. The seed images, which will be adding adversarial perturbations, are selected from the first 100 correctly pre dicted examples in the 1000 selected images on each DNN model for all the attack methods. The legitimate examples classification accuracy (acci) is the testing accuracy of be nign images processed by the defense method. The defense efficiency is measured by the classification accuracy (accm) of 100 polluted images after applying the defense method.
Optimized Quantization Step
Defending against adversarial examples. Fig. 4 (a) and (b) illustrate the impact of the quantization steps of the 8*8 table under various adversarial attacks with our onepass and two-pass defense approaches applied, respectively. Apparently, both processes demonstrate that the defense ef ficiency can be steadily improved as the QS grows, how ever, it will be saturated (even decreased) if QS becomes too large for the two pass (one pass) process. Compared with the one pass process, the two pass process always de livers much better defense efficiency against most of the ad versarial attacks (except the CWo), due to the elimination of the rounding error. The reason is because CWo attacks attempt to use a minimum number of pixel(s) with maxi mum perturbations to fool the DNN models, therefore the perturbations of each single pixel will translate into larger magnitudes than the other attacks in the frequency domain. This leads to a much higher QS for completely removing the associated perturbations, as Fig. 4 (a) and (b) show.
Evaluating testing accuracy. Fig. 4 (c) shows the test ing accuracy changes w.r.t. QSs for both malicious exam ples (accm) and legitimate examples (acci). The accm (1 pass) and accm (2 pass) represent the average accuracy of various adversarial examples by applying our one pass and two pass process, respectively. As Fig. 4 (c) shows, accm (1 pass) and acci demonstrate an opposite trend as QS grows, but they have a cross-over zone between QS=20 and QS=40. The adversarial perturbation dominates the accuracy reduc tion before the cross-over point (small QS), however, after that, both accm (1 pass) and acci will decrease due to the enlarged QS. On the other hand, accm (2 pass) increases consistently as QS increases because of additional defen sive quantization in compression stage. Therefore, we set £ 2 = 2 0 and £ i= 5 0 fo r the top-n largest j (AS Band) and the others (MD Band), respectively, to better balance the accm and acci, according to our flow in Fig. 2 . Fig. 4 (d) validates that such a configuration o f (£ 1 , £ 2 ) at n -15 minimizes the degradation ofacci (< 1%).
Theoretical validation o f defensive QS. Fig. 4 (e) fur ther compare our analytic results (see Eq. 5) with ex perimental results for selecting QS. We use FGSM at tack with 5 different perturbation strengths (i.e. e = 0.005,0.007,0.01,0.012,0.015) as an example. The cor responding analytic QS values based on Eq. 5 should be: 20.5, 28.7, 41, 49.2 and 61.44, respectively (dash lines in Fig. 4 (e) ). As expected, those analytical values are in ex cellent agreement with the experimental results when the defense efficiencies reach 100%.
Enhanced Robustness Against AE
Based on our explorations on parameters optimization in section 4.2, we adopt £ 1 = 30, £ 2 = 20, n = 15 to evaluate the overall defense efficiency. Note although we focus on defense efficiency, the images compressed by our method still provide acceptable visual quality (detailed results are summarized in the supplemental material). Table. 1 compares the defense efficiency of two proposed methods (i.e., 1-pass feature distillation FD-1P and 2-pass version FD-2P) with five baselines-no defense, JPEG, Bitdepth, Quilting and TVM against 6 selected adversarial ex amples for MobileNet. Note that JPEG (90% quality) and Bit-depth (5-bits) are conducted under the premise o f< 1% legitimate classification accuracy reduction. However, the other two methods Quilting and TVM, cannot satisfy this constraint, so we compare our approach with those two methods on both acci and accm.
Gray Box M itigation
Comparison with bit-depth and JPEG. We first limit our comparisons to the defense with < 1 % reduction of acq under no defense. In this case, Quilting and TVM are not included and will be compared separately.
Overall, FD-2P shows much better performance than that of FD-1P (56% v.s. 91% on average). Compared with no defense baseline, our FD-2P improves the average accuracy on adversarial examples from ~ 3.5% to ~ 91%, which demonstrates the best mitigation efficiency among all meth ods. Moreover, FD-2P can significantly outperform two other defensive baselines among all selected adversarial ex amples, i.e. improved by ~ 69% (or ~ 73%) on average than the bit-dept (5-bit) or JPEG on both DNN models.
Particularly, for attacks like FGSM, В Ш and CWi, existing model-agnostic methods show very limited effi ciency. Similarly, our one pass method FD-1P shows marginal improvement when compared with the existing approaches. However, our two pass method FD-2P can al most completely remove this type of L 00 perturbations and deliver the best defense efficiency. Besides, for the L 2 at tacks, especially CW2, existing defense methods show good defense efficiency (~ 68%). Again FD-2P can rectify this kind of adversarial examples with almost 100%. Compared with Lao and L 2, the improvement of L 0 attacks (CW0) is less significant, however, FD-2P still achieves more than 50% defense efficiency improvement comparing with bitdepth and JPEG. That is because, JPEG (90% quality) uses small quantization steps (or large QFs) to maintain the qual ity of legitimate images for desirable accuracy, however, is also resulting in a low defense efficiency. Bit-depth roughly quantizes all image pixels uniformly, while our method dis tills the features in a more fine-grained manner by maximiz ing the loss of adversarial perturbations and minimizing the distortions of benign features.
Comparison with Quilting/TVM. We also compare our solutions with Quilting and TVM in three aspects: accm, acci, and processing-time-per-image. Our average defense efficiency is much higher than the other two, i.e. 56%/91% (FD-1P/FD-2P) v.s. 50.5% (quilting), 59.8% (TVM). We also achieve the best testing accuracy (acq), that is 68.5% (FD-1P/2P) v.s. 63.5% (quilting), 60% (TVM). Moreover, we improve the processing-time-per-image (i.e., 0.15s on FD-1P) by ~ 216 X (~ 259 x ) compared with Quilting (32.4s) and TVM (38.8s), or 0.15s (FD-1P) v.s. 32.4s (quilt ing) and 38.8s (TVM), as Table 1 shows.
In general, our proposed feature distillation is particu- First, Bit-depth, quilting and TVM does not offer any defense against BPDA, as expected. Second, JPEG can slightly mitigate BPDA by degrading image quality, i.e. quality factor from 75 to 10, defense efficiency (accm) is improved from 0 to 45%. This is consistent with the recent result [21] . However, acci drops by 17% compared to base line (61% v.s. 78%), which is unacceptable. This reason is because in order to eliminate a large perturbation of BPDA attack in the lowest frequency component in JPEG, a sig nificant large quantization factor (QF) will be needed. As a result, large quantization errors will occur in high frequency components, thereby significantly hurting acci. Third, On the other hand, our solution can provide the best defense ef ficiency against BPDA with least acc; reduction among all solutions, i.e. from FD (IX) to FD (3X), accm is improved from 10% to 60%, with merely l%-3% acci reduction com pared to original 78%. FD-1 x , 2 x , 3 x represent the quan tization step (QS) of FD adopted in Table. 1 (reference), 2 times and 3 times of the referred QS, respectively.
Black Box M itigation
We follow the work [11] for black-box analysis: DNN model used for testing is trained on transformed dataset (Feature Distillation), while attackers generate adversarial examples from the model trained on the original dataset.
The crafted examples have high transferability between the two models for fair black-box analysis. We adopt Mo bileNet and the results of our methods are shown in Fig. 5 . The average defense efficiency is improved from 56%/91% (Table 1) to 81%/99% (black-box) for our FD-1P/FD-2P method, respectively. These results indicate that our method defends against black-box setting efficiently. This is also consistent with the following conclusion based on [3, 11] : Black box setting shows weak attack efficiency against the input-transformation based defenses.
. C onclusion
As the robustness of DNN is significantly challenged by a variety of adversarial attacks, existing studies inves tigate the standard JPEG compression as a defense method, however, it is far from satisfactory in terms of both de fense efficiency and testing accuracy. In this work, we pro pose the DNN-favorable feature distillation method by re architecting the JPEG compression framework. Compared with existing model-agnostic defense approaches, our "fea ture distillation" can simultaneously reduce the adversarial attack success rate and maximize the testing accuracy on legitimate examples. Experimental results show that our method can improve the defense efficiency from ~ 20% to ~ 90% over most recent model-agnostic approaches with only marginal accuracy degradation (< 1%), while signif icantly improving the processing time per image (~ 260 x speedup). Our method also demonstrates the best defense efficiency against latest adaptive attack-BPDA (~ 60%) with least accuracy drop (~ 1%) when compared with other input-transformation based defenses.
A cknow ledgem ent
This work is partially supported by the NSF under Grant CNS-1840813.
